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La relation IDE-croissance : une décomposition des effets directs et indirects 
Résumé 
Dans cet article, nous soutenons l’idée que c’est une mauvaise spécification des modèles 
qui peut  expliquer la difficulté des études empiriques à proposer  une évaluation robuste 
et convergente de l'effet des IDE sur la croissance. Nous construisons pour évaluer la 
complexité de la relation IDE/Croissance un modèle structurel avec attraction endogène 
des FDI, en données de panel, pour un échantillon de pays du sud et de l’Est de la 
méditerranée (MENA). Dans nos estimations, les effets directs des IDE sur la croissance 
ne sont pas significatifs mais il existe des mécanismes de transmission  indirects qui 
passent par  les exportations ou la formation de capital humain. 
Mots-clés : IDE, croissance, attractivité, pays MENA, équations simultanées 
 
FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue  
Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that the inadequacy of their underlying formal model can explain 
the failure of the existing empirical studies to exhibit a robust and convergent estimation 
of the effect of FDI on growth. We build a structural model of growth with endogenous 
attraction to FDI, and we estimate it on panel data for a sample of Middle East and 
North Africa countries (MENA). Direct effects of FDI on growth are not significant, and 
we show that FDI is not only responsive to growth, but it is also likely to promote 
increases of GDP through indirect channels as it spurs the formation of human capital 
and exports. 
Keywords: FDI, growth, attraction, MENA, simultaneous equations 
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An ever growing series of developing countries have introduced attraction of FDI measures 
as part of their ongoing structural reforms. These measures frequently act as investment 
promotion device or incentives and they bear a cost that is supposed to be more than balanced by 
the beneficial effects of FDI on growth and employment. Investment from multinational 
corporations is indeed believed to stimulate growth by the way of addition to the domestic 
accumulation capacities and through the modernization of the means of production. De Gregorio 
(1992) ou Blomström et al. (1994) have shown that FDI is three times more efficient than 
domestic investment especially owing to their crowding-in and spillover effects.  In addition, 
FDI is also likely to produce backward linkages allowing for the diversification of domestic 
firms and forward linkages through the provision of domestic firms with more sophisticated 
inputs (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen & Venables, 1999). But above all, FDI is supposed to 
increase the productivity of domestic firms by creating external advantages through technology 
spillover, training of workers, incentives for investing in human capital, or easier access to world 
market (OECD, 2002)
1.  
Yet, a remaining puzzle of this literature is the lack of robustness of the results about the 
direct effects of FDI on growth across existing cross-section studies (UNCTAD, 1999; Carkovic 
& Levine, 2005). Results are contradictory and generally very sensitive to the choice of countries 
and to the changes of specification and of estimators
2. The meaning of that failure could be that 
either there is no significant effect of FDI on growth, or it is not correctly assessed by existing 
aggregate empirical models. In this paper, we claim that the inadequacy of the standard formal 
models could be an explanation for that failure of aggregate cross-sections to provide robust and 
consistent results. Some of the most common methodological choices of this literature must be 
questioned actually.  
A first problem is that the quality of standard estimations might be altered by problems of 
reverse causality since FDI should be attracted by countries with a rather high growth rate (Li & 
Liu, 2005). A related issue is that attraction to FDI is possibly endogenous to the magnitude of 
the inflows already received. A key issue is that foreign investment probably stimulates 
technological capacities, human capital and skills, as well as the degree of integration to the 
international trade. Yet, these factors are likely attractors for FDI (Lim, 2001; Chakrabarti, 2001; 
Kamaly, 2001) and FDI inflows and these structural factors of attraction should be mutually 
linked in the right hand side of the growth regressions. A possible outcome is that estimations for 
the coefficient of FDI are not robust. 
Moreover, these structural factors are at the same time critical factors of GDP growth. 
There are consequently possible indirect effects of FDI on growth operating through the channel 
of these key intermediate variables. The observed relationship between growth and FDI shall be 
better assessed through its joint effects with well-known engines of growth such as investment, 
human capital, technological capacities or infrastructure. The main reason is that those factors 
are constitutive of the capacity of the host economy to absorb the technological and 
organizational shocks from FDI and to transform them in productivity gains. A handful of 
empirical analyses relying on aggregate data have accordingly provided evidence that higher 
provisions of human capital, technological knowledge, financial development, trade openness or 
                                                 
1 Sector-based empirical studies have shown that this outcome is conditioned by factors such as the density of the 
connection between foreign subsidiaries and the local firms (either partners or competitors) or the ability of the 
domestic firms to absorb the technological and organizational innovations from MNCs (Blomström, 1986; Moran, 
1998; Moran et al., 2005). 
2 See Li and Liu (2005) or Crespo and Fontoura (2008) for recent surveys of empirical results. FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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infrastructure shall ease the coming out of growth enhancement effects from FDI (Borensztein et 
al., 1998; Balasubramanyam et al., 1996, Bende et al., 2000; OECD, 2002; Hermes & Lensink, 
2003; Alfaro et al., 2004, Li & Liu, 2005). Identifying absorption capacities allows assessing 
complementarities between factors of growth including FDI. Nevertheless, it does not allow 
measuring the indirect effects of FDI on growth and identifying the channels through which they 
operate. This purpose would require a structural formal model allowing for the measurement of 
indirect effects.  
Furthermore, increased inflows of FDI are likely to produce a kind of virtuous circle that 
further increases the degree to which the economy will attract FDI and its capacity to get 
advantage of FDI through spillover effects. In spite of its evident appeal, the existing empirical 
literature has rarely adequately addressed this concern. In fact, empirical studies generally split 
the two questions of the attraction and of the effects of FDI on growth, and only a few studies 
(Bende et al., 2000, 2003; Li & Liu 2005) have explicitly but partially associated them altogether 
in a common structural model.  
In this paper, we propose a structural model of growth whereby an explicit treatment of the 
complex linkages between FDI, its determinants and the factors that matter for productivity 
spillover is possible. We go further than the previous studies of Bende et al. (2000, 2003) or Li 
and Liu (2005) because we not only control for the endogenity of FDI to growth, but we also 
control for the endogenity of FDI relative to the other variables (trade openness, domestic 
investment, human development) which are likely to increase the effects of foreign investments 
on growth through the absorption capacities building.  
We further test this model on panel data on a set of Middle East and North African 
economies (hereafter MENA) and show that it brings in interesting and new results about the 
interactions between attraction, FDI and growth in MENA countries (Middle East and North 
Africa countries). The MENA countries are relevant for our purpose because they generally not 
display positive direct effects of FDI on growth. All these countries have converted to attraction 
policies since the beginning of the nineties, but they generally failed to uphold their shares of 
world FDI during the period. There are odds that the relative weakness of FDI inflows in MENA 
countries results from an attraction that is still too low, and that this very weakness hamper the 
spillover effects of FDI on growth. At the end of the 1990s, the under-performance of MENA 
countries in terms of FDI attraction started to be highlighted. Petri (1998) underlines the lack of 
performance for FDI attraction by comparing it to the higher performances of similar countries. 
In MENA countries, the FDI share in GDP was on average of 0.9%vduring the 1990s, against 
2.5% for African countries, 3.8% for Eastern Asia and 4.5% for Latin America (Sekkat, 2004). A 
few years later, despite a fast increase in the flow of received FDI for some of the MENA 
countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt), this weakness in the attraction capacities of this area is still 
perceived as a problem (Iqbal & Nabli, 2004; Chan & Gemayel, 2004; Sekkat, 2004; Daniele & 
Marani, 2006). Most of the analyses concur to explain the weak attraction performances of 
MENA countries by a narrow international and regional integration despite the proximity of the 
European market and firms (Noland & Pack, 2007; Iqbal & Nabli, 2004), and by the slowness 
and inefficiency of structural reforms regarding infrastructure, privatizations, shifts in 
regulations and red-tape improvement (Chan & Gemayel, 2004; Sekkat, 2004; Benassy-Quéré et 
al., 2005; Aysan et al., 2006; Daniele & Marani, 2006; Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 
2007) that at the end of the day fail to create adequate conditions for the establishment of foreign 
firms.  
 Another feature of these countries is that despite the significant tendency toward 
liberalization of trade and investment, they could not reach the growth levels experienced by the 
South and East Asian economies (Iqbal & Nabli, 2004; Chan & Gemayel, 2004; Sekkat, 2004; FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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Daniele & Marani, 2006; Noland & Pack, 2007). As regards horizontal FDI, it might be that FDI 
could lessen the domestic capacities of accumulation of the region, the resulting crowding-out 
effects being detrimental to economic growth
3. Sadik and Bolbol (2001) give evidence on six 
Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt) over 1978-1998 that 
FDI have more effects on growth via capital accumulation than via productivity gains, and they 
even measure a significantly negative effect of FDI on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Egypt
4. But, at the same time, the alleged weak capacities of 
absorption of the MENA countries compared to other developing countries has been put forward 
to explain the weak effects of FDI on growth (Sekkat, 2004; Elmawazini, 2007). That means that 
the common structural determinants of attraction and of spillover could be too weak in MENA 
both to attract a sufficient amount of FDI and to produce significant spillover effects.  
In the next section, we survey the main results of the empirical literature about the drivers 
of FDI and the effects of FDI on growth, and we point out that the inadequacy of the underlying 
models that are generally used can explain the lack of robustness and convergence of the cross-
section empirical results. We then describe the model and the econometric approach in section 2, 
and the results are displayed and discussed in section 3, before section concludes.  
I. FDI attraction and absorption capacities: the need for an 
adequate formal model 
Our basic aim in this section is to show that the common nature of the determinants of 
attraction and the factors that catalyze the effects of FDI on growth can produce a bias in the 
commonly adopted econometric approach and that the most convenient model is probably a 
simultaneous equation one. The other point is that this model allows estimating indirect effects 
of FDI on growth, even while the former has no significant direct effect on the latter. 
The standard linear exogenous models for explaining the effect of FDI on GDP growth 
(Growth) takes the following form (1): 
Growth = Φ Z + α FDI + Θ Controls       ( 1 )  
Where Z is the set of the structural determinant of attraction identified above (openness, 
human capital, infrastructure, financial development, macroeconomic environment), Controls 
stands for the usual controls for growth, and FDI is the inflow of foreign direct investment.  
This standard model provides weak evidence of the positive effects of FDI on growth. A 
remaining puzzle on this literature is the lack of robustness of the results from existing cross-
section studies. Borensztein et al. (1998), Hermes & Lensink (2003), Alfaro et al. (2004) or 
Durham (2004) all fail to grasp a significant effect of FDI on GDP growth with various countries 
and time coverage when FDI is introduced alone in the estimation. But results are often 
contradictory and very sensitive to the choice of specification
5. UNCTAD (1999), Ram and 
                                                 
3 As for the FDI received by Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, inflows of FDI concern sectors that generally induce few 
technological spillover effects (energy and textile for Tunisia, energy and services for Jordan) or sectors that benefit 
from a high level of protection against external competition for Egypt (Sadik & Bolbol, 2001).  
4 FDI do not explain significantly growth for Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia.  
5 Furthermore, the available cross-sectional data on FDI do not provide the information necessary to test if the 
productivity gap of local firms matched with foreign affiliates can be explained by the effectiveness of technological 
spillover or, in a simpler way, by a selection bias. As an illustration, it is likely that the initially most efficient local 
firms will at the same time be more able to access foreign markets (because they are more competitive) and to attract 
the partnership offers from foreign firms (because they are more efficient and less distant from the technological 
frontier). It can also happen that the positive correlation between growth and FDI be the result of the increased FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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Zhang (2002) and Bloningen and Wang (2004) detect a positive association between growth and 
FDI, but it disappears for some specifications
6 or when some variables are used to measure 
inflows of FDI. The introduction of additional fixed effects and the correction for the 
simultaneity bias between investments and growth produce positive significant and robust effects 
of FDI on growth for Li and Liu (2005) but these results are not confirmed by Carkovic and 
Levine (2005) who do not find any robust result with a different sample and a different period, 
but with a similar model.  
A possible explanation for the lack of robustness of the previous results is that the effects 
of FDI on growth should be gauged through that channelling of the absorption capacities. 
Inflows of FDI are traditionally supposed to support growth through the utilization of domestic 
labour or the crowding-in of domestic investment, but it also contributes to increasing the 
productive efficiency of domestic firms through spillover effects
7. But, the effectiveness of the 
productivity spillovers is not unconditional. For example, early microeconomic evidence from 
Blomström (1986), Kokko (1994) and Kokko et al. (1996) pointed out to the fact that the 
presence of foreign firms has a more important effect on local firms when the technologies 
shared are simpler, and when the improvement of the technological performance imposed to the 
local firms by competition, or by the linkage with the foreign firm, is accessible to them. In 
accordance with the previous firm-level results, cross-country studies have pointed out to a series 
of structural factors that interact with FDI to spur growth through productivity spillover. Görg 
and Hijzen (2004) show that imitation and learning increase when cultural and geographical 
proximities are higher, but economic capacities of the receiving country are equally essential. 
Thus, Xu (2000), Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Li and Liu (2005) provide significant 
evidence that the smaller is the technological gap between foreign and local firms, the stronger 
the FDI impact on the receiving economy will be
8. Blomström et al. (1994), Borensztein et al. 
(1998), Lipsey (2000) or Bloningen and Wang (2004), Li and Liu (2005) have provided robust 
evidence that the education level is crucial to catalyze the FDI effects on growth because it 
enables larger technological spillover obtained from workers mobility
9. It has also been shown 
that trade openness
10 (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996, Bende et al., 2000; OECD, 2002; Basu et 
                                                                                                                                                             
concentration generated by the pro-competitive effect of incoming FDI, without any significant spillover effects 
towards initially less productive local firms. For this kind of analysis, see Blomström (1986, 1989) on Mexico. 
6 Among the variables that get well into the specifications, we find the level of GDP per capita, education, domestic 
investment, political instability, terms of trade, the black market premium and the level of financial development 
(UNCTAD : 1999). In Bloningen and Wang (2004) estimations, the FDI coefficient is not significant in all 
developed and developing countries but it becomes positive significant only in the developing countries 
7 Firm-based studies generally indicate that spillover occurs through a series of specific channels like connections 
with foreign firms along the value chain, training by MNC subsidiaries, turnover of workers between foreign and 
local firms as well as assistance to access the global markets by foreign firms in contact with local companies. 
Moran (1998) has shown that the magnitude of the spillover effects depends on the degree of cooperation between 
foreign firms and local suppliers in production and in access to global markets, and are increasing with the 
complexity of the tasks devoted to the latter, thus enabling them to quickly become competitive exporters and get 
integrated to global value chains. For developing countries, the proof of significant spillover effects increasing the 
productivity of the host country’s industries has been made by firm level surveys by Aitken et al. (1997), Blomström 
(1986) and Kokko (1994) for Mexico, Blomström et al. (1994) for Uruguay, Sjoholmn (1999) and Blalock (2001) 
for Indonesia, Batra and Tan (2002) for Malaysia, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for Czech firms and Javorcik 
(2004) for the Lithuanian manufacturing industry. 
8 See Bende-Nabende et al. (2003), on macro-economic data, and Sjoholm (1999) on micro-economic data. 
9 However, the hypothesis of a threshold for absorption capacities has been seriously challenged by Carkovic and 
Levine (2005) who underline that the likelihood for technological spillover to occur could be independent from the 
human capital provisions, or that it can increase together with the intensity of the technological gap, and not the 
contrary. 
10  Openness to trade favours vertical FDI and lowers horizontal FDI. FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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al., 2003), export diversification (Nicet-Chenaf & Rougier, 2009), financial development
11 
(Hermes & Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004; Durham, 2004), or a more efficient and stable 
legal and institutional environment
12 (Olofsdotter, 1998; Bangoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003; 
Busse & Groizard, 2006), all favour the positive effects of FDI on growth. In order to assess the 
catalyse effects and to measure thresholds of absorption capacities, these papers generally use a 
variant (1’) of the standard equation (1) where Interactives stands for the interactive terms used 
to assess the effect of FDI on growth that operate through catalyst factors such as education, 
trade openness, diversification, financial development: 
Growth = Φ Z + α FDI + ζ Interactives + Θ Controls     (1’) 
A major limitation of the specification (1’) is that it just allows assessing the 
complementarities between two factors of growth and the magnitude by which the first one 
increases or decreases the effect the second one has on growth. Interactive term just shows that a 
given level of FDI has a larger contribution to the explanation of growth when human capital, 
financial development or trade openness is higher. A significant coefficient for a given 
interactive term does not mean that FDI spurs growth through that very channel, but almost that 
they are complementary in their operation on growth. Consequently, this approach does not help 
to identify the mechanisms through which this growth effect of FDI operates at an aggregate 
level. Moreover, their results just suggest what Blomström et al. (1994) had accurately pointed 
out, that the existence of significant effects of FDI on growth requires that the receiving country 
has reached the level of development required for the formation of adequate absorptive 
capacities.  
Another limitation is that it does not address the problem of endogenity between GDP 
growth and FDI though. Li and Liu (2005), or Basu et al. (2003) have explicitly addressed this 
concern, but with a different approach. As the latter propose a simple cointegration analysis
13, 
the former build a structural model of growth and FDI
14. Their underlying formal model takes in 
partial endogenity so as to assess the net effect of FDI on growth. The model is formed of the 
model (I) below: 
 
 
                ( 1 )    
()
                   (2)                                                          





=Φ + +Θ ⎧
⎨ =+ ⎩
 
The point is that none of the two models (1’) and (1)-(2) explicitly control for the likely 
endogenity of the Z vector to FDI. Empirical studies put forward an ever-growing number of 
explanatory variables for attraction
15. De Mello (1997), Kamaly (2001), Chakrabarti (2001) and 
Lim (2001) gather a heterogeneous set of robust factors that explain inflows of FDI. They 
generally use the standard specification given by equation (2)
16: 
                                                 
11 By improving the access to credit and easing the domestic investments, developed and competitive banking and 
financial systems increase the complementary possibilities between foreign investments and local firms that are 
necessary to the generation of technological spillover.  
12 Steadier legal and political institutions, less regulated markets and more adapted administrative rules all favour 
spillover from FDI.   
13 They basically evidence that FDI and growth are mutually explained only for the more open economies, and that 
FDI does not significantly explain growth for non liberalized countries. 
14 Li and Liu (2005) show that FDI and economic growth are mutually reinforcing from the mid-1980s onwards and 
that the coefficient of the former remains significant when endogeneity is controlled for.  
15 For recent surveys, see Chakrabarti, (2001), Kamaly (2003), Lim (2005) and Crespo and Fontoura (2008). 
16 However, Chakrabarti (2001) or Kamaly (2001) have underlined the methodological limits of this empirical 
literature. One of them is that assessing factors of FDI attraction from econometric estimations of equation (2’) is 
puzzling because the empirical assessment does not rest on a robust and constituted theory. Moreover, there are FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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                  FDI Z Controls μ δ =+         (2’) 
Among them, traditional advantages such as the size of the market and its rate of 
expansion (Lim, 2001; Chakrabarti, 2001; Basu & Srinivasan, 2002) or labour costs (Basu & 
Srinivasan, 2002, Yeaple, 2003; Hanson et al., 2003) remain logically central to explain FDI 
attraction
17. But FDI is also significantly attracted by structural dimensions such as financial 
development (Durham, 2004; Alfaro et al., 2004), macroeconomic stability (Klein & Rosengren, 
1994, Apergis & Katrakilidis, 1998; Sekkat & Varoudakis-Veganzones, 2007), the degree of 
trade openness
18 (Kumar, 2000; Benassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Sekkat & Vaganzones-Varoudakis, 
2007) or human capital and skills (Helpman, 1984; Basu & Srinivasan, 2002; Bloningen, 2005). 
The extent of institutional development and the quality of administrative rules are also important 
determinants for the capacity for an economy to receive increasing inflows of FDI, especially, as 
has recently been argued by Helpman (2005), by decreasing the unpredictable costs that foreign 
investors address in developing economies (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2005; and for MENA, Sekkat 
& Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007).  
A peculiar point here is that FDI attraction can be endogenous to the inflows of FDI 
because they contribute to the formation of skills or to the integration of domestic firms to the 
global supply chains. This is also particularly true for the institutional and red-tape environment 
of the investment that is likely to be partially endogenous as more foreign investors get more 
political power and are able to exert more pressures towards a more secured and environment. In 
addition, Lim (2001), Hanson (2001), Kamaly (2003) and Yehoue (2005) have all pointed out 
the significance of FDI stocks to explain the intensity of the current inflow of FDI in developing 
countries. These stocks interact with the quality of infrastructures and labour to produce positive 
externalities for the foreign firms, especially in special economic zones. This concern has been 
tackled by Bende-Nabende et al. (2000) who endogenize some of variables included in Z in 
order to account for the mutual relationship between FDI and Z. They add a third equation to the 
previous (1)-(2): 
             Z FDI Controls ρ β =+          (3) 
From what precedes, we claim that matters of growth and attraction should be addressed 
simultaneously for the reason that we can assume that there is a likely circular linkage between 
FDI inflows, GDP growth, and the determinants for both the attraction to foreign investment and 
the absorption capacities of an economy. This concern has clearly been underlined by Görg & 
Greenaway (2002) when they argue that FDI can be endogenous to growth because its size and 
its content depend on the various dimensions of a country's attraction, particularly when it is 
assessed in terms of the main factors of growth and development. FDI is then endogenous to Z 
but some variables from Z are also the set of factors governing the effectiveness of spillover 
effects from FDI. Moreover, FDI is likely to have feedback effects over the host country’s 
absorption capacities too. The previous effects can be positive, when FDI is prone to induce 
                                                                                                                                                             
possible biases due to the fact that the models that are commonly used do not control enough for parametric 
heterogeneity or for the dynamic nature of the underlying process that would require more adapted econometric 
modelling (Kamaly, 2003).  
17 Lim (2001) reports a set of works that qualify this result and reveal its sensibility to the measurement of the 
selected labour costs.  
18 Trade openness indeed acts ambiguously on the decisions to settle since, if trade and investments were substitutes 
to feed the national market, higher tariffs would stimulate inward FDI, but would also be an obstacle to vertical FDI 
with a high import content of exportations. But the puzzle is strengthened by the ever more complex strategies of 
transnational corporations since a firm located in a country to produce and export can also sell a part of its 
production locally if the domestic market offers dynamic opportunities for its production (Markusen et al., 1996; 
Shatz & Venable, 2000). 
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technological acquisition or export competitiveness for the local partners of foreign firms, or 
contribute to the training of workers of the host country. But they can also be adverse if the 
competition inflicted by the foreign subsidiaries on local firms drop down the shares of domestic 
capital or local technological capacities of the latter.  
Up till now, the empirical literature has seldom addressed the concern of the dynamic 
feedbacks adequately. Significant estimation problems can then occur from these endogenous 
links if they are not corrected. The inadequacy of the common formal models could be an 
explanation for the lack of robustness of the results from existing cross-section studies.   
What we propose is to explicitly afford for the influence of Z in the attraction for FDI in 
the equation (3) and to introduce GDP growth as an additional determinant of some of the 
catalyst factors in (4). The model becomes: 
  
               (1)  
( )     Z +               (2'')
                                   (3')                     
Growth Z FDI Controls
II FDI Growth Controls




=Φ + +Θ ⎧
⎪ =+ ⎨
⎪ =+ + ⎩
 
In the system (II), equations (1) and (2’’) show that growth and FDI attraction display 
common structural factors included in Z. Moreover, equation (3’) suggests that the factors of 
attraction and catalyse could be endogenously determined both by GDP growth and inflows of 
FDI.  
Our hypothesis is that indirect effects on GDP growth from FDI could be stronger than 
their direct impact, but standard empirical models can not gauge these indirect effects because 
they are not adequate. Our hypothesis is that the relative weakness of FDI is the consequence of 
an attraction that is still too weak, and that this weakness simultaneously restricts the spillover 
effects of FDI on growth. Or it could also be that FDI weakens the regional capacities of 
domestic accumulation, and that some crowding-out effects detrimental to growth happen.  
2. Model and methods  
The purpose of our paper is to provide an advance in the understanding of the channels 
whereby FDI and growth interact. Consequently, we have built a structural model made out of 
five simultaneous equations and we estimate this model on a panel of seven countries
19 from the 
Southern Mediterranean shore over the 1975-2004 period. The model has a linear form, and is 
written as follows:  
FDI = f (GDPgrowth, Energy, Education, Openness, Inflation)    
 (1) 
GDPgrowth = f (FDI, Education, Export, Investment)     
 (2) 
Education = f (FDI, Educspend, Urban)         
 (3) 
Export = f (FDI, Exrate, Telephone)        
 (4) 
Investment = f (GDPgrowth, FDI, Credit, Interest, Savings)     (5) 
The two central equation (1) and (2) of our model are thus linking economic growth to 
FDI, controlling for other growth factors such as domestic investment, exports and human 
                                                 
19 Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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capital. The endogenous variables are the GDP growth per capita (GDPgrowth); the net inflows 
of direct foreign investment in percentage of GDP (FDI),  the human capital which is 
approximated by the gross school rate at secondary level (Education)
20, the share of domestic 
investment in GDP (Investment) and the share of exports of goods and services in GDP (Export). 
The exogenous variables are the ratio of the credit to the private sector to the GDP (Credit)), the 
spending on education in percentage of GDP (Educspend), the production of energy expressed in 
1000 T.O.E. (Tons of Oil Equivalent) (Energy), the domestic saving rate (Savings), the annual 
inflation rate (Inflation), the capital cost measured by the real interest rate (Interest), the 
exchange rate of the dollar against the local currency (Exrate), the number of telephone 
subscribers per 1000 persons (infrastructure of the communication facilities) (Telephone), as 
well as the degree of urbanization measured by the urban population in percentage of the total 
population  (Urban) as a proxy of the access to social, cultural, medical and educative 
amenities
21. The equations of the system and the expected sign of the various variables are 
summarized in Table 1. 
                                                 
20 However, we must admit that the school rates constitute an indicator that should be used with caution because 
they are a rather inadequate measure of education levels and of the degree and structure of qualification of the 
labour force. But they are the only data allowing international comparisons. 
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Cr   +    +   
IDE  +   + +/-  + 
KH  + +       
ID  +        
EXPORT  +        
CREDIT       +   
Déducation     +     
ENERGIE   +       
EPARGNE       +   
Inflation   -       
INTERET       -   
M2          
OUVERT   +       
TEL         + 
TXCHANGE         + 
URBAN     +     
 
The system of equations is overidentified, therefore the model can be solved. By 
implementing the method of the Two Stage Least Squares (2LS) to the system of equations, we 
aim at estimating together the magnitude of FDI, Education, Investment and Exports on growth, 
and the way FDI endogenously affects these growth determinants. Furthermore, the model sheds 
light on the factors explaining FDI inflows and their effects on growth in the South 
Mediterranean region. The Hausman tests
22 show that the fixed effects model is preferred to the 
random effects model. It is indeed more adapted to capture the unobserved specific effects of the 
countries, such as institutions, geographical characteristics, cultural norms, that could influence 
both FDI and economic growth.   
To avoid the risk of fallacious regressions between dependent and explanatory variables, 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC) and Im, Shin & Pesaran (ISP) 
(Im  et al., 2003) tests of stationarity have been applied to all the variables of the model 
[Appendix B]
23. These tests show that except for GDPgrowth,  Investment,  EXPORT, 
INFLATION,  INTEREST and TEL, all other variables (CREDIT,  ENERGY,  SAVING,  FDI, 
EducSpend, OPEN, Education, M2, URBAN, EXRATE) have a unit root but are stationary in first 
                                                 
22 The results of the Hausman test are reported in Table 6 




24. Therefore, in the regressions, all the previous non stationary variables have been 
computed in first difference while the stationary variables remain in level. Moreover, the matrix 
of partial correlations reported in appendix C indicates that there are no serious problems of 
multicolinearity between the explanatory variables included in the regressions.  
III. Results and comments 
Only a limited bunch of works have tried to seize the FDI effects on growth at an 
aggregate level for MENA countries
25. Bouklia and Zatla (2001) only find a weak significant 
effect of FDI on growth, while Darrat et al. (2005) and Meschi (2006) do not find any significant 
effect. Results are then deceptive regarding the expected effects of FDI on growth, and they 
converge even if the countries and time period coverage differ across studies. Note that among 
these works on MENA, Bouklia-Hassane and Zatla (2001) is the only one to articulate attraction 
and spillover effects, but they only proposes a sequential estimation strategy for these two 
relations, without any attempt to model endogenous FDI or attraction.  
The results for the estimation of the structural model are fully reported in the Table 1 to 5 
of  Appendix D. For the sake of convenience, they have been summed-up in the following 
equations (Student’s t and degrees of significance
26 are reported below each estimated 
coefficient): 
(1) GDPgrowth = -0.17 FDI + 0.13 Education + 0.21 Export  +  0.04 Investment – 11.99 
              (0.55)            (4.14***)           (3.65***)     (0.68)    (3.94**) 
  R2 = 0.51, F*** = 24.23 
 
(2 ) FDI = 0.008 GDPgrowth +0.02Education +4.05E-06Energy + 0.09Export-0.004 Inflation-0.73  
                           (2.22**)               (5.26***)                 (1.81*)   (2.37***)   (1.79*) (2.53***) 
    R2 = 0.23, F***=18.48 
 
(3) Export = 2.93 FDI + 4.98E-06 Exrate + 0.03 Telephone  + 22.86 
                 (3.37***)                 (1.86*)             (2.02**)  (4.83***) 
  R2 = 0.81, F***=46.55 
 
(4) Education = 5.68 FDI + 0.52 Urban + 0.29 Educspend  + 3.86 
           (4.91***)           (6.70***)       (5.70***)   (1.01) 
  R2 = 0.88, F***=50.55 
 
                                                 
24 Given that the results on the stationarity of variables sometimes diverge according to the method which is used 
(ADF or Levin, Lin & Chu or ISP, etc.), we consider that a variable is only stationary when at least two tests 
indicate that the variable does not have a unit root. 
25 The very few firm-level surveys made on MENA countries are generally not conclusive about the existence of 
significant productivity spillover from received FDI. Haddad & Harrison (1993), then Harrison (1996) found few 
empirical proofs of existence of technological spillover for local firms, even if at the same time the joint-ventures in 
Morocco were displaying higher productive performances than the local firms. Yet, Bouoiyour & Akhawayn (2005) 
more recently show on a panel of Moroccan industries that FDI has a significant spillover effect on the productivity 
of labour, and that this impact is proportional to the technological gap between foreign subsidiaries and domestic 
firms and increase with the openness of the export sectors.  
 
26 Conventionally, *** stands for 1% significance, ** for 5% and * for 10%. FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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(5) Investment = -0.30GDPgrowth+0.30 FDI -0.06Interest + 0.26 Savings + 0.07 Credit+16.68 
                                (1.43*)      (0.46)       (1.34)             (4.27***)       (2.75***)     (8.73***) 
  R2 = 0.58, F*** = 43.95 
 
The comments are organized as follows. We oppose the direct and indirect effects of the 
structural factors of FDI attraction on growth (a). From them on, we test for the occurrence of 
crowding-in effects in the MENA countries (b), and we question the attraction of FDI in an 
endogenous framework (c).  
 (a) The indirect effects of FDI on growth for MENA 
Results for the estimation of GDP growth are reported in Table 5 of Appendix D. 
According to them, it turns out that the coefficient for FDI is not significant so that it has no 
significant direct contribution to the economic growth in MENA countries.  
Such a result could be puzzling in comparison to the theoretical literature that tends to 
take for granted the positive effect of FDI on host economies. But it actually confirms the studies 
on this region by Sadik and Bolbol (2001), Sekkat (2004), Darrat et al. (2005) and Elmawazini 
(2007) which generally fail to measure a significant impact of FDI on income growth. 
Obviously, the weakness of FDI flows towards these countries partly explains this result. But, as 
we do not control for the quality of foreign investments, the absence of any direct impact from 
FDI on growth in MENA countries could be explained by the poor ability of the investment 
received to produce the expected technological spillover. Sadik and Bolbol (2001) or Meschi 
(2006) thus explain the weakness of spillover effects by the very nature of the FDI received by 
MENA countries, since they are mostly made of primary and tertiary investments that produce 
few technological externalities. Microeconomic analysis (Kokko, 1994; Kokko et al., 1996; 
Moran, 1998; Harrison, 1996; Görg & Hijzen, 2004) have shown that the impact of FDI on local 
production systems is tightly linked to the type of establishment (Greenfield or Merger 
Acquisition), the sector of activity, or the degree of competition or complementarities between 
foreign and local firms. 
Yet, the works that have been dedicated to MENA countries up to now can only gauge 
the global effects of FDI on growth, without telling the difference between direct and indirect 
effects. The latter actually perform through the variables that cause together the attraction and 
growth of an economy. Our model enables us to distinguish direct and indirect effects and to 
assess more consistently the spillover effects. FDI has a positive and significant impact on 
education and export [Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix D] and education and export have a 
similar impact on growth on their own [Table 5 in Appendix D]. Consequently, our results 
suggest that FDI is likely to have an indirect positive effect on growth through alleged engines of 
growth such as exports and human capital. They not only act as factors of attraction for FDI 
[Table 2 in Appendix D], but also as conditions for FDI to have significant effects on growth. In 
fact, they act as channels through which FDI has an effective impact on growth in the long run. 
In that double way, they are constitutive of the host country’s capacity to absorb the technology 
and productivity gains from FDI. 
The indirect effects of FDI on growth can then be recomposed as reported in the 
following Figure 2. The values of the estimated coefficients that are used are taken from the 
Tables 1 to 5 in Appendix D. 
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 is the elasticity of exports to FDI and it can be seen as the measurement of the 
impact of a FDI shock on exports. The indirect effect FDI is likely to have on growth throughout 














*  = 0.21*2.93 = 0.61 
Figure 2.  Direct and indirect effects of FDI on growth (Calculations from the 
authors) 
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0.13 is the elasticity of GDP growth to human capital and it can be seen as the 
measurement of the impact of a human capital shock on growth. Then we can similarly 














*  = 5.68*0.13 = 0.73 
Consequently, it suggests that FDI has an indirect effect on growth through the exports 
and the skill promotion effects. Both those variables are together significant determinants of FDI 
attraction and catalyst factors for the FDI effects on growth. We can remark however that the 
indirect effect trough human capital formation is larger than the effect trough trade. 
 Therefore, failure of the previous studies to measure an effect of FDI on growth in 
MENA countries does not necessarily mean that spillover effects do not exist. A more 
appropriate model allows capturing some of these effects for MENA countries, without 
contradicting the more global result according to which the FDI variability does not explain 
significantly the growth variability between the different countries and the different years of the 
sample. If FDI affects growth in MENA countries, it could be through the indirect channel of the 
training and turn-over of the labour force and of the incitement to invest in human capital. But 
the wider access to the world market for local firms that become exporters is another channel 
through which the indirect effects of FDI on growth is expected to occur in the MENA countries.  
 
(b) Crowding-in or crowding-out? 
  It is quite important to find out to what extent FDI can overthrow [« crowding out»] or 
spur [« crowding in »] the domestic investment. We must note that crowding-out effects of FDI 
were more frequently observed than the crowding-in in the context of developing countries 
FDI  Investment 
Export 
GDPgrowth 
Education FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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(Caves, 1996; Agosin and Machado, 2005). But there has not been any proper survey on this 
effect concerning MENA countries. This matter is addressed by the literature either by including 
the domestic investment directly into the growth equation et al., 1998) or by estimating a 
domestic investment equation that incorporate FDI (Agosin & Mayer, 2000; Mc Millan, 1999, 
Agosin and Machado, 2005). Yet, the likely complementarities between foreign investment and 
domestic firms have been emphasized by Rodriguez-Clare (1996) or Markusen and Venables 
(1999). But crowding-out effects can result from the setting up of barriers to entry, thus 
discouraging the incoming of new firms and causing the exit of local entrepreneurs (Backer, 
2002).  
The results for equation (5) are reported in Table 6. They show that FDI does not have a 
significant effect on domestic investment in MENA countries. This can be explained by the 
absence of significant crowding-in effects generated by the settlement of foreign firms in the 
MENA economies, thus supporting the thesis of enclave formation by these very firms. 
Moreover, the variable that expresses the real interest rate is not significant, even though it bears 
the expected sign. Lastly, according to the model, it seems that the domestic credit, the savings 
and to a lesser degree the growth of GDP, take a significant part in the accumulation of domestic 
capital. Furthermore, the table 1 showed that the domestic investment does not seem to have a 
significant impact on the economic growth of MENA countries. This might be due to the 
predominance of the public sector in these countries. 
(c)  Endogenous FDI attraction 
Regarding the Equation (2), all the variables are significant and have the appropriate sign. 
Education, economic growth and export seem to be the most deciding factors of FDI attraction in 
MENA countries. Not surprisingly, endowments in natural resources also explains FDI inflows 
in these countries, yet one could expect a much higher degree of significance given the rather 
high relative share of commodities and hydrocarbons in the trade structure of some of these 
countries. Inflation has a negative and significant sign at 10%, indicating that foreign investors 
are not insensitive to economic instability. Of course, the performance of MENA countries in 
attracting FDI is also particularly affected by the quality of legal institutions and administrative 
red-tape (Iqbal & Nabli, 2004; Benassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Sekkat and Vaganzones-Varoudakis, 
2007), but we could not control for it in estimations because of the time shortage in existing data 
on institutions.  
In the peculiar context of our structural model, it has been shown that FDI inflows 
depend positively on the levels of education and the export performance of host economies. But 
these determinants of attraction are also fed by FDI in the way that they are enhanced by the 
higher inflows of FDI. From the equation (3), it turns out that FDI significantly explain exports 
from MENA countries, suggesting either that local firms benefit from the access to world 
markets of the foreign affiliates, or that a large number of subsidiaries settled in these countries 
could have adopted a vertical strategy and export their production towards their country of origin 
or their parent companies. But data on the structure of exports by firms would be required to 
qualify this assumption. In the same way, in their efforts to attract FDI, MENA countries have 
implemented measures such as the setting up of free zones, the abolition of hindrances to import 
and export, or tax incentives which could have contributed to the increase of trade between these 
countries and the rest of the world. The proxy for infrastructure (Telephone) is also significantly 
positive suggesting that infrastructure is a condition for the promotion of exports because it may 
reduce trade costs by making export easier and cheaper, for both national and foreign companies. 
Empirical studies have also underlined their significant impact on FDI inflows for MENA 
countries (Bouklia-Hassane & Zatla, 2001; Sekkat & Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007). Exchange FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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rates depreciation seems to have had a positive and significant impact on exports for MENA 
countries as well, after years of overvaluation of their currencies in fixed exchange rates regimes.  
Results from the estimation of equation (4) indicate that government spending in 
education robustly explains the accumulation of human capital in MENA countries. 
Unsurprisingly, the positive coefficient for urbanization also suggests that, next to the education 
expenses, belonging to urban areas enable to have an easier access to various key amenities 
(social, cultural, health, political, etc.) and accordingly stimulate the private accumulation of 
knowledge and the development of personal skills. But a less familiar result is that FDI also acts 
positively and significantly on the development of human capital. Because of their size and the 
advanced norms and technology they promote, it can be expected that the foreign subsidiaries 
take part in the improvement of the human capital in the host country through training activities, 
participation to R&D activities, etc
27. But FDI is likely to raise the returns from skills as workers 
employed by subsidiaries of foreign firms benefit from higher wages than they would have 
benefited in local firms too. Increasing inflows of FDI can then produce additional incentives to 
invest in schooling and skill acquisition for young adults. 
The ability for MENA countries to attract foreign investment is thus dependent on those 
structural factors that allow FDI to promote increases in productivity and aggregate growth. 
Increasing the potential for attraction of FDI through education and export promotion is a 
relevant policy choice because it also enhances the potential for spillover effects of foreign 
investment. But, we further show that these structural dimensions consequently act as catalyst 
factors through which FDI can exert an indirect effect on growth in the long run. 
Conclusion 
The FDI effects on growth are not easy to understand. Most probably, FDI and 
productivity gains have a two-way relationship (Görg & Greenaway, 2002) or the former has 
only indirect effects on the latter. Our results show that FDI has no significant direct effect on 
growth. But the structure of our model allows showing that FDI still play an indirect role in 
growth through their positive effects on the formation of human capital and the international 
integration in MENA countries.   
Moreover, the relationship is likely to be cumulative as the efficiency gains in production 
are the consequence of spillover effects and pro-competing effects of incoming FDI, but they 
also act as a factor of attraction for new FDI inflows. This is especially true for vertical FDI and 
when the productivity gains rest partly on the gains linked to the concentration of investments 
(clusters). Economic policy must then be carried out in several directions that ought to be 
complementary. The empirical results obtained on MENA countries show that it is much more 
difficult to benefit from foreign investors than to convince them to come and settle in a host 
country, especially since these investors are not always settled where they are the most needed. 
We lessen this observation by showing that FDI can have a positive indirect effect on growth as 
long as they increase the local capacities of absorption via the training of human capital and 
allow a deeper integration of the local production system within the global market and value 
chains. Therefore, the biggest challenge for MENA countries is to know how to get advantage of 
the presence of MNC upon their territories and what to do to make them become drivers for 
growth and economic development.  
                                                 
27  For OECD (2002), the presence of foreign firms could be a key factor for the development of new skills in the 
receiving developing economy, especially when knowledge cannot be codified. Indeed, the skills gained through 
working for a foreign firm can take the form of tacit know-how that is impossible neither to formulate nor to codify, 
the best way to pass them on being to imitate or adapt them in other firms.  FDI and growth: A new look at a still puzzling issue 
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The challenge for MENA countries is to improve their attraction to FDI through a series of 
more ambitious structural policies (openness to trade and regional integration, development of 
institutions and infrastructure). The point is that these reforms also contribute to the creation of 
an environment that is more favourable to spillover effects since they improve the social returns 
to domestic and foreign investments (Sadik & Bolbol, 2001; Hausmann & Rodrik, 2004). It is 
thus necessary for policy makers to address the questions of the attraction of FDI and their 
effects on growth in a simultaneous way.  
Policy-makers in the MENA region should probably follow the two upcoming paths. 
Firstly, they should promote the international integration of MENA countries as it is 
recommended in the recent World Bank reports on MENA countries (World Bank, 2006; World 
Bank, 2007) And secondly, they should create more favourable conditions for vertical FDI 
(special zone, infrastructure, labour training). In this regard, several questions remain 
unanswered: are government interventions useful to negotiate with foreign investors and make 
them aware of their responsibilities to do better? Do the attraction policies followed by MENA 
countries over almost two decades produce social returns over their social and private cost? 
Sector-based analyses using disaggregated data according to the type of FDI could bring in more 
light on these questions. It could be accordingly interesting to carry out some cost/benefit 
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Appendix A. Stationnarity tests 
 




In level  In first 
difference  
In level  In first 
difference  




(46.42)*** -  (-1.82)**  - (-4.54)*** - 
FDI  (18.16) (95.81)***  (-0.11)  (-7.53)***  (-0.63) (-10.52)*** 
Export  (25.62)*** -  (-1.97)**  - (-2.12)*** - 
Education  (17.76) (40.74)*** (-2.36)***  (-4.46)***  (0.62)  (-3.99)*** 
Investment  (27.67)*** -  (-2.60)***  - (-2.47)*** - 
Credit  (17.58) (46.11)***  (-0.81)  (-3.27)***  (-0.54) (-4.35)*** 
Energy  (12.14) (40.97)***  (-0.36)  (-2.52)***  (0.71)  (-3.99)*** 
Educspend  (16.75) (78.10)***  (-1.24)  (-6.45)***  (-0.04) (-7.78)*** 
Openness  (12.44) (65.82)***  (-0.24)  (-6.34)***  (0.30)  (-6.31)*** 
Interest  (22.45)* -  (-2.85)***  - (-1.85)**  - 
Savings  (12.51) (65.30)***  (3.69)  (-4.98)***  (0.03)  (-6.60)*** 
Telephone  (27.06)*** -  (-1.32)*  -  (-0.43)  - 
Exrate  (12.99) (39.15)***  (-0.42)  (-5.88)***  (-0.28) (-3.96)*** 
Inflation  (19.67) -  (-1.54)*  - (-1.36)*  - 
Urban  (3.53) (15.75)  (0.47)  (-1.90)**  (-0.05)  (-4.09)*** 




Appendix B. Data and sources 
Variables  Source Unit 
GDPgrowth  WDI % 
FDI  UNCTAD %  GDP 
Education  WDI %net 
Investment  WDI %GDP 
Export  CHELEM - CEPPI  %GDP 
Credit  WDI %  GDP 
Educspend  WDI %GDP 
Energy  WDI  Ton of Oil Equivalent 
Savings  WDI %GDP 
Inflation  WDI Index  (%) 
Interest  WDI % 
Openness  CHELEM - CEPPI  % 
Telephone  WDI  Fixed line and mobile 
phone (1.000 subscribers) 
Exrate  CHELEM - CEPPI  USD against the local 
currency 
Urban  WDI  % total population 
 


















































































































































tment ,13  ,00 
 
Expo
rt 0,02  ,16  ,00 
 
Inflat
ion 0,10  0,12  0,44  ,00 
 
Inter
est  ,19  0,10 ,31  0,70 ,00 
 
Telep
hone  0,05  0,26 ,14 ,43  0,07 ,00
 
∆Cre
dit  ,03 ,06 ,04  0,13 ,18  0,03 ,00
 
∆Ene
rgy  ,11  ,18 0,10 0,02 0,03 0,18 0,03 ,00
 
∆Sav
ings  ,05  0,06 ,06  0,06 ,02  0,02 0,01 ,11 ,00
 
∆FDI 
0,01 ,01 ,04  0,03 ,02 ,01 ,00 0,07 0,12 ,00
 
∆Edu
cspend  0,19  0,03 ,07 ,12  0,03 ,25 0,05 0,12 0,06 0,06 ,00
 
∆Ope
nness  0,18 ,02 ,20 ,12  0,15 ,05 ,01 0,07 0,07 ,12 ,09 ,00
 
∆Sch








an  0,09  ,07  ,08  ,15 0,03 0,09 0,01 0,06 ,07 0,05 ,03 ,09
-
0,07 0,03  ,00
∆Exr
ate  0,13  0,09 ,00 ,32 ,01 ,49 0,09 0,06 0,03 ,03 ,31 ,06
-
0,02 ,13  0,03 ,00
•   
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